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Abstract
Under the assumption of bounded rationality, economic agents learn from their past
mistaken predictions by combining new and old information to form new beliefs. The purpose
of this paper is to examine how the policy-maker, by affecting private agents’ learning process,
determines the speed at which the economy converges to the rational expectation equilibrium.
I ﬁnd that by reacting strongly to private agents’ expected inﬂation, a central bank would
increase the speed of convergence.
I assess the relevance of the transition period from the learning to the rational
expectations equilibrium when looking at a criterion for evaluating monetary policy decisions
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∗ Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department.1. Introduction
1
There is wide consensus on the fact that monetary policy may affect real variables in
the short run. One recent strand of research has obtained this result explicitly incorporating
frictions, such as nominal price rigidities, in a dynamic general equilibrium framework under
the rational expectations hypothesis.
Recently, this issue has been analyzed questioning the assumption that agents are able to
make unbiased predictions of the future course of the economy. Such predictions, it has been
said, would be possible if people had observed the reactions of the policy-maker to various
economic conditions over a long period of time. However, this would not always be the case.
It can be argued, for example, that in the presence of policy regime shifts the public needs
to learn about the new regime: in the early stages of this learning process, previously held
public beliefs could lead to biased predictions. In order to avoid asymptotic instability in the
economy, Evans and Honkapohja (2002a, 2002b, 2003) and Bullard and Mitra (2002) suggest
that economic policies should be designed to be conducive to long-run convergence of private
expectations to rational expectations (E-Stability)
2. These papers and, in general, the literature
on monetary policy and bounded rationality are extensively devoted to the analysis of the
asymptotic properties of the equilibrium attainable under learning. There is, however, very
little literature that studies the dynamic properties along the convergence process.
The purpose of this work is to examine how the policy-maker, by affecting private
agents’ learning process, can inﬂuence the transition to the rational expectations equilibrium
(REE). I show that policies driving the economy to thesame asymptotic REE could imply very
different transitional dynamics in the real economy. By reacting strongly to expected inﬂation,
a central bank would shorten the transition and increase the speed of convergence from the
learning equilibrium to the REE.
1 I am particularly grateful to my advisor Albert Marcet for many helpful comments and discussions. I also
thank Seppo Honkaphja, Kosuke Aoki, Ramon Marimon, Jordi Galì, Antonio Ciccone, Jose Rodriguez Vicente-
Mora and Alfonso Rosolia for their comments. All remaining errors are mine. The opinions expressed here do
not necessarily reﬂect those of the Bank of Italy.
2 An earlier paper by Howitt (1992) had already shown that under some interest rate rules the rational
expectation equilibrium is not learnable.8
This is particularly relevant when policy decisions aim to inﬂuence social welfare: if
policy-makers know that after a regime change private agents’ perceived inﬂation would be
higher than the REE, by choosing a policy that reacts strongly to expected inﬂation they could
substantially increase social welfare. If, instead, perceived inﬂation is initially lower than the
REE, a weak response to expected inﬂation and a slow transition might be preferable.
In order to study the transition in the learning process to the REE I adapt arguments
described by Marcet and Sargent (1995), which in turn are based on the theoretical results of
Benveniste, Metivier and Priouret (1990).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the monetary policy design
problem, describing the learning equilibrium under two different policy rules. The section
ends showing that under the optimal RE discretionary policy, transition to the REE is very
long. In section 3 I show how the policy-maker could characterize policies, evaluating the
speed at which the learning equilibrium converges to the REE. In section 4 I study policies
that allow the central bank to increase (or reduce) the speed of convergence without affecting
the long-run equilibrium (i.e., the REE equilibrium) and in section 5 I analyze how these
policies inﬂuence social welfare.
2. The framework
2.1 The baseline model
Much of the recent theoretical analysison monetary policy has been conducted under the
“New Phillips curve” paradigm reviewed in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999) and Woodford
(1999). The baseline framework is a dynamic general equilibrium model with money and
temporary nominal price rigidities. I consider the linearized reduced form of the economy
with competitive monopolistic ﬁrms, staggered prices and private agents that maximize
intertemporal utility. From the private agents’ point of view there is an intertemporal IS curve
xt = E
∗
txt+1 − ϕ(it −E
∗
t πt+1)+gt (2.1)
and an aggregate supply (AS) modeled by an expectations-augmented Phillips curve:
πt = αxt + βE
∗
tπt+1, (2.2)9
where xt is the output gap, measured as the log deviation of actual output (yt) from potential
output (zt) (i.e., the level of output that would arise if wages and prices were perfectly
competitive and ﬂexible), πt is actual inﬂation at time t, E∗
t πt+1 is the level of inﬂation
expected by private agents for period t +1 , given the information at time t. Similarly E∗
txt+1
is the level of the output gap that private agents expect for period t +1 , given the information
at time t.Iw r i t eE∗
t to indicate that expectations need not be rational (Et without ∗ denotes
RE); it is the short-term nominal interest rate and is taken to be the instrument for monetary






The IS relationship approximates the Euler equation characterizing optimal
aggregate consumption choices and the parameter ϕ can be interpreted as the rate of
intertemporal substitution. The AS relation
3 approximates aggregate pricing emerging from
monopolistically competitive ﬁrms’ optimal behaviour in Calvo’s model of staggered price
determination
4.
In order to complete the model, it is necessary to specify how the interest rate is settled
and how agents form beliefs. Choosing between policies based on simple rules or derived as a
solution of a speciﬁed optimization problem is the starting point for the analysis of monetary
policies. In the literature, there is no consensus on the terminology for rules and optimal
policies. Here I consider the nominal interest rate as the policy instrument and model it by
means of a reaction function, that is, a functional relationship between a dependent variable
(the interest rate) and some endogenous (expected inﬂation and output gap) and exogenous
(shocks) variables. I consider three cases. I start with a simple expectations-based policy
rule that helps me to introduce in a very simple and intuitive way the concept of speed of
convergence. Second, I describe the optimal RE policy under discretion derived in Evans and
Honkapohja (2002)
5. Finally, I introduce a set of expectations-based policy rules and show
how to discriminate between the elements of this set, using a measureof speed of convergence.
3 Here we are not considering cost-push shocks. Introducing cost-push shocks in the Phillips curve would
not change substantially the results on speed of convergence and the role of policy decisions along the transition.
In section 5 I also analyze brieﬂy results in terms of welfare also when I introduce cost-push shocks in the AS.
4 Inﬂation is increasing with the output gap as price are set as a markup over real marginal costs, which
are increasing with the output gap. Higher expected inﬂation raises current inﬂation, as price setters cannot fully
adjust to current shocks.
5 Ileaveforfutureresearchageneralstudy of thetransition oflearning process formonetary policyproblem
under commitment10
Concerning beliefs, I start each analysis by considering the rational expectations
hypothesis in order to focus and discuss subsequently the implications of bounded rationality.
2.2 A simple expectations-based reaction function
It has long been recognized that monetary policy needs a forward-looking dimension.
Let us assume that the central bank, in order to set the current interest rate, uses simple policy
rules that feed back from expected values of future inﬂation and output gap





The class of expectations-based reaction functions that I ﬁrst consider has γx =
1
ϕ in
order to simplify the interaction between actual and expected variables. Under (2.3), in fact,





























where neither the IS nor the AS are affected by expectations on output gap
6.
2.2.1 The rational expectations equilibrium
Under rational expectations (i.e. E∗
txt+1 = Etxt+1 and E∗
t πt+1 = Etπt+1)i th a s
been shown that the dynamic system deﬁned by (2.4) has a unique non-explosive equilibrium
(Bullard and Mitra, 2002). The equilibrium can be written as a linear function of a constant
and the shocks
7:
πt = aπ + αgt and xt = ax + gt, (2.5)
6 For a more general class of expectations-based policy rules without restrictions on γx I refer to section 3.
7 The solution (2.5) is often referred to as the minimal state variable (MSV) solution, following McCallum
(1983), who introduced the concept for linear rational expectations models. This is a solution which depends
linearly on a set of variables (here gt and the intercept) and which is such that there does not exist a solution that





(1 − β − αϕ(1 − γπ))
and ax = ϕγ + ϕ(1 − γπ)aπ. (2.6)
Note that expression (2.5) describes the actual law of motion (ALM) of inﬂation and
the output gap under RE hypothesis and policy (2.3). Private agents’ perceived law of motion
( P L M )o fi n ﬂation and the output gap under RE are constant and equal to
Etπt+1 = aπ and Etxt+1 = ax. (2.7)
Lemma 1 Under the simple expectations-based reaction function (2.3) the necessary and




<γ π < 1+
1+β
αϕ
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.
While the previous lemma provides a characterization of the REE under the
expectations-based reaction function (2.3), the following lemma underlines the relevance of
policy-maker decisions in characterizing the REE and shows how the parameter γπ inﬂuences
output gap and inﬂation equilibrium.
Lemma 2 Under the simple expectations-based reaction function (2.3) and under RE: if
γ ￿=0 ,f o rγπ > 1, the higher the value of γπ the higher the inﬂation and output gap levels, for
γπ < 1 the higher the value of γπ the lower the inﬂation and output gap levels.
Proof. See Appendix 2.B.
Let us now characterize the equilibrium relaxing the hypothesis of rational expectations.
2.3 Learning models and policy analysis
The current standard hypothesis about expectations in monetary policy design is the
rational expectations hypothesis, meaning that agents do not make systematic forecasting
8 See Appendix 1 for a derivation of the REE.12
errors and their guesses about the future are on average correct. In this paper I focus on
a different approach to modeling expectations. I assume that households and ﬁrms make
forecasts using adaptive learning algorithms. Under this approach, the rational expectations
equilibrium may become a limit of the temporary learning equilibrium. By contrast, the
rational expectations approach retains rational expectations equilibrium continuously over
time.
In the literature, economic models with adaptive learning hypothesis have been used for
two different purposes. First, because they provide an asymptotic justiﬁcation for RE and a
selection device in the presence of multiple REE, they have been used to offer a rationale for
rational expectations. Second, they offer a description of the behaviour of the economy not
only asymptotically, but also along the transition to the REE, showing dynamics that are not
available under perfect rationality and that could be empirically relevant. Papers more focused
on the ﬁrst aspect of bounded rationality are, for example, those of Evans and Honkapohja
(2002), Bullard and Mitra (2001) and Bullard and Mitra (2002); papers centred on the analysis
of equilibrium along the transition to the REE include Timmerman (1996), Sargent (1999) and
Marcet and Nicolini (2001). I follow this second approach and show that considering learning
in a model of monetary policy design is particularly relevant in order to describe not only
the rational expectations equilibrium to which we could converge under “plausible” learning
schemes, but also the dynamics along the transition to that equilibrium.
2.3.1 The learning mechanism
Let us assume that private agents form expectations by learning from past experiences
and update their forecasts through recursive least squares estimates
9.
Since, under the simple expectations-based reaction function (2.3), neither the IS nor
the AS relations depend on expected output gap, the learning equilibrium can be described
by focusing on beliefs regarding expected inﬂation
10. I assume that agents do not know the
effective value of aπ in equation (2.5), but estimate it using past information. In this case,
9 SeeMarcetandSargent(1989a, b)orEvans andHonkapohja(2001)foradetailedanalysisofleastsquares
learning.
10 In the next section I show formally that this does not affect the results.13
private agents’ expected inﬂation is given by:
E
∗
t πt+1 = aπ,t, (2.8)
where aπ,t is a statistic inferred recursively from past data according to
aπ,t = aπ,t−1 + t
−1(πt−1 − aπ,t−1). (2.9)
The perceived law of motion of inﬂation is updated by a term that depends on the last
prediction error
11 weighted by the gain sequence t−1. It is well known that in this case the
adaptive procedure is the result of a least squares regression of inﬂation on a constant, and







By substituting (2.8) into (2.4) I obtain the actual law of motion of inﬂation under
adaptive learning:
πt = αϕγ +[ β + αϕ(1 − γπ)]aπ,t + αgt. (2.11)
An important aspect of recursive learning is that the learning equilibrium may converge
to the REE, i.e., the estimated parameters aπ,t converge asymptotically to aπ.I n o r d e r t o
providetheconditionsfor asymptoticstabilityof theREEunderleast squareslearning, Ifollow
the strand of the literature that uses the E-Stability principle (Marcet and Sargent, 1989a and
Evans and Honkapohja, 2001).
2.3.2 E-stability of the REE
The stability under learning (E-stability) of a particular equilibrium, is addressed by
studying the mapping from the estimated parameters, i.e., the perceived law of motion (PLM),
to the true data generating process, i.e., the actual law of motion (ALM).
11 This formula implies that private agents do not use today’si n ﬂation to formulate their forecasts. This
assumption is made purely for convenience and it is often made in models of learning as it simpliﬁes solving the
model. The dynamics of the model are unlikely to change.14
When expectations in system (2.4) evolve according to expression (2.8), the inﬂation’s
ALM is
πt = T (aπ,t)+αgt, (2.12)
where
T (aπ,t)=αϕγ +[ β + αϕ(1 − γπ)]aπ,t (2.13)
is the mapping from PLM to ALM of inﬂation.




[T (aπ,t) − aπ,t]. (2.14)
As shown in Marcet and Sargent (1999a,b) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001), it turns
out that the dynamic system described by equations (2.9), (2.12) and (2.13) can be studied in
terms of the associated ordinary differential equation (ODE)
daπ
dτ
= h(aπ)=T (aπ) −aπ, (2.15)
where τ denotes “notional” or “artiﬁcial” time. Note that the unique ﬁxed point of the T-map,
the aπ that makes
daπ
dτ = 0, is the level of inﬂation described inequation (2.6), i.e., the REE, aπ.
The REE is said to be E-stable if it is locally asymptotically stable under equation (2.14) and
under some regularity conditions. As stressed by Evans and Honkapohja (2001), “E-stability
determinesthe stability of the REEunder a stylized learning rule in which thePLM parameters
(aπ,t, in our case) are adjusted slowly in the direction of the implied ALM”. Stability under
learning, or learnability of the REE, is desirable because it indicates that if agents are learning
from past data, their forecasts will converge over time to the REE.
The following lemma describes the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions under which the
REE (2.5) is E-stable, pointing out the role of policy decisions.15
Lemma 3 Under the simple expectations-based reaction function (2.3), the REE of (2.4) is
E-stable if and only if
γπ > 1 −
1 −β
αϕ
Proof. See Appendix 2.C.
I now show that policy decisions (i.e., the value γπ) are important not only to obtain an
improvement in private agents’ forecasts, but also to determine the speed at which the distance
between PLM and ALM shorten over time and the learning equilibrium converges to the REE.
2.3.3 Speed of convergence to the REE
Figure 1 plots the mapping from PLM to ALM (2.13) and shows how private agents’
estimates affect actual inﬂation along the transition to the REE.
Fig 1
Mapping from PLM to ALM
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Lemma 3 states that if the slope of the mapping is smaller than 1, the REE is E-stable,
that is, if we start from a perceived level of inﬂation aL < aπ or aH > aπ, the mean of the
prediction error (i.e., the distance between the ALM and the T(.) mapping), T (aπ,t) − aπ,t,
decreases over time and asymptotically converges to zero (i.e., it converges to the point aπ).16
Is there any difference between a policy that results in the slope of T(.),
[β + αϕ(1 − γπ) ]=0 .00001 and one with [β + αϕ(1 − γπ) ]=0 .99999? Looking at the
recent literature on monetary policy and learning (Evans and Honkapohja 2001, 2002a, 2002b,
2003 and Bullard and Mitra 2002), the answer is negative. Since in both cases the REE is
unique and E-stable, both policies are “good”. However, looking at Figure 1 it is clear that the
learning equilibrium along the transition is very different under the two policies. By choosing
the γπ, in fact, the policy-maker not only determines the level of inﬂation in the REE, but also
the speed at which the distance between perceived and actual inﬂation narrows.
In the literature, the problem of the speed of convergence of recursive least square
learning algorithms is analyzed mainly through numerical procedures and simulations. The
few analytical results are obtained by using a theorem of Benveniste, Metiver and Priouret
(1990) that relates the speed of convergence of the learning process to the eigenvalues of the
associated ordinary differential equation (ODE) at the ﬁxed point
12. In the present case, the
ODE to be analyzed is the one described in expression (2.15) and the associated eigenvalue is
β + αϕ(1 − γπ), i.e., the slope of the mapping from PLM to ALM (2.13).
Thefollowing propositions, adapting argumentsin Marcet and Sargent (1995), showthat
the closer the slope of the mapping from PLM to ALM to 0.5, the slower the learning process.
Proposition 4 Let us deﬁne
S1 =
￿
γπ : γπ >
αϕ + β − 1/2
αϕ
￿
















[1 −β − αϕ(1 −γπ)]
(2.16)
Proof. See Appendix 2.D.
12 See see for example Marcet and Sargent (1995) for an interpretation of the ODE.17
If the conditions of proposition 4 are satisﬁed, the estimates aπ,t converge to the RE
value aπ at root-t speed, that is, the speed at which in classical econometrics the mean of
the distribution of the least square estimates converges to the true value of the parameters
estimated. Note that the formula for the variance of the estimator aπ is modiﬁed with respect
to the classical case where σ2
a = α2σ2
g.
Proposition 5 Under the simple expectations-based reaction function (2.3), if γπ ∈ S1, then
the weaker the response to expected inﬂation (the smaller γπ), the greater the asymptotic
variance of the limiting distribution, σ2
a.
Proof. See Appendix 2.E.
Looking at the formula for the asymptotic variance (2.16) it is possible to understand
the role of policy decisions in determining the speed of convergence to the REE: for a weaker
response to expected inﬂation, the slope of the T(.) mapping is steeper and the convergence is
slower in the sense that the asymptotic variance of the limiting distribution is greater.








.I f γπ ∈ S2, the estimates
aπ,t converge to the REE aπ, but at a speed different from root-t. In this case, as Marcet and
Sargent (1995) suggest, the importance of initial conditions fails to die out at an exponential
rate (as is needed for root-t convergence) and the learning equilibrium converges to the REE
at a rate slower than root-t. In particular, even when γπ ∈ S2 it is possible to show by
means of simulations that as the slope of the T(.) mapping increases, the speed of convergence
decreases
13. Figure 2 shows examples for the two cases where γπ ∈ S1 and γπ ∈ S2.
Since the least squares algorithm adjusts each parameter towards the truth when new
information is received, the new belief aπ,t+1 will be an average of the previous beliefs aπ,t
and the actual value T (aπ,t) plus an error. When the reaction of the policy maker to expected
inﬂation is strong (γπ ∈ S1), the derivative of T (.) is smaller than (or equal to) 1/2 and
T (aπ,t) is close to aπ; when the reaction is weak (γπ ∈ S2), the derivative of T (.) is larger
than 1/2 and T (aπ,t) is close to aπ,t instead of being close to aπ, so the average can stay far
from the REE for a long time.
13 See section 4 for simulations that relate speed of convergence and the slope of the T() mapping.18
Fig. 2
Mapping from PLM to ALM and the speed of convergence
a) Low γπ b) High γπ
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It is worth noting that even though the transition is quite different in the two cases
analyzed here, the learning equilibrium could end up converging to the same REE and,
according to policy-maker preferences, the speed of convergence could become a relevant
variable in the policy decision problem.
2.4 Optimal monetary policy under discretion
The reason the analysis starts with the simple expectations-based reaction function (2.3)
is that it simpliﬁes the dynamics under learning. I now consider the optimal monetary policy
problem without commitment (discretionary policies), where any promises made in the past
by the policy-maker do not constrain current decisions. In deriving the optimal discretionary
policy, I follow Evans and Honkapohja (2002), assuming that the policy-maker cannot
manipulate private agent’s beliefs. This assumption implies that the optimality conditions
derived under learning are equivalent to the ones obtained under RE.
The policy problem consists in choosing the time path for the instrument it to engineer















t + λ(xt − x)
2￿
(2.18)
subject to the constraints (2.1) and (2.2) and E∗
tπt+1, E∗
txt+1 given.
The solution of this problem





















The optimal outcome could be written as a reaction function that relates the policy










t πt+1 + γ
￿
ggt (2.21)
14 I consider λ as an exogenous policy parameter, as is often done in monetary policy literature. An alter-
native approach is to obtain λ as the result of the general equilibrium problem. In this case λ would depend on
representative consumer preferences and ﬁrms’ price setting rules.

























































Since interest rate rule (2.21) states that the policy maker should react to the expected
inﬂation and output gap, it is sometimes called the optimal expectations-based reaction
function (Evans and Honkapohja, 2002). However, to stress the fact that this policy is optimal
under rational expectations but is not necessarily optimal under learning, I call it the RE-
optimal expectations-based reaction function
16.
Under rational expectations (i.e. E∗
txt+1 = Etxt+1 and E∗
t πt+1 = Etπt+1)t h e
equilibrium of the dynamic system deﬁned by (2.19) and (2.20) is:




(λ + α2) −λβ
x and ax =
λ(1 − β)
(λ + α2) − λβ
x.
Assuming, instead, that private agents do not know aπ and ax but estimate them
recursively, the expected inﬂation and output gap would be given by
E
∗
t πt+1 = aπ,t and E
∗
t xt+1 = ax,t,
where aπ,t and ax,t are inferred recursively from past data according to
aπ,t = aπ,t−1 + t
−1 (πt−1 − aπ,t−1)
16 I ns e c t i o n s4a n d5Ic a l li tEvans and Honkapohja (EH) policy, to avoid notational ﬂutter.21
ax,t = ax,t−1 + t
−1(xt−1 − ax,t−1)
and the ALM of the economy would be


















is the mapping from PLM to ALM.
Now, since the right-hand side of (2.25) does not depend on ax,t, as in the previous
section, properties of the learning equilibrium can be described simply by focusing on the








For reasonable values of the parameters
17, the following lemma could be derived (Evans
and Honkapohja, 2002):
Lemma 6 Under the RE-optimal expectations-based reaction function the rational
expectations equilibrium is unique and E-stable.
Proof. See Evans and Honkapohja (2002).
Lemma 6 states that the RE-optimal expectations-based policy rule derived as the
optimal solution of the problem under discretion and rational expectations is a “good” policy,
not only under RE but also under the hypothesis that private agents update their forecasts
through recursive least squares estimates. Here with “good” policy I refer to the criterion used
17 Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) and Woodford (1999) derive from regressions on US data respectively,
the following values for the economy parameters
ϕ =1 , α =0 .3, β =0 .99, ρu =0 .35
ϕ =0 .17, α =0 .024, β =0 .99, ρu =0 .3522
by Bullard and Mitra (2001) to evaluate policy rules, based on determinacy and E-stability of
the REE.
However, simulating the model under the RE-optimal expectations-based reaction
function, with λ = 0.5 and Clarida, Galì and Gertler (2000) calibration, the distance between
the learning equilibrium and the REE would be signiﬁcatively different from zero for many
periods.
Figure 3 shows the evolution of perceived inﬂation under learning for this policy.
Assumingan initial perceived inﬂation 15 per cent higher than the REE, more than450periods
(quarters) are needed to reduce the distance between the perceived inﬂation and the REE from
15 to 5 per cent
18!
Fig 3
Deviation of actual inﬂation from the REE
Quarters
Deviation from REE
Applying a similar argument to that used in propositions 4 and 5 it is possible to state the
following proposition about the speed of convergence and the role of the weight to output gap
in the welfare function, λ.
Proposition 7 Under the RE-optimal expectations-based reaction function, the speed of
convergence of the learning process depends negatively on the weight that the policy-maker
18 With Woodford (1999) calibration the convergence is even slower.23
gives tooutput gap relative to inﬂation. Inparticular, under ﬂexible inﬂation targeting policies
(λ > 0), the greater the weight to output gap, the slower the learning process.
Proof. See Appendix 2.F.
Under learning, with the RE-optimal expectations-based reaction function, proposition
7, by looking at theslope ofthe mapping from perceived inﬂation to actual inﬂation, relates the
speed of convergence of thelearning equilibrium to therelevance of output gap in theobjective
function (2.17).
Fig 4









Figure4 shows howtheslope of the mappingfrom thePLMtoALMof inﬂation changes
as the weight that the policy-maker gives to the output gap relatively to inﬂation increases
19.
Table 1 shows that when the policy-maker cares equally about output gap and inﬂation
(λ =1 ), the slope of the mapping of PLM to ALM is around 0.9; when he cares less about
output gap than inﬂation the slope is smaller (for example if λ =0 .5, then the slope is 0.84)
but, unless λ is smaller than 0.1, root-t convergence is never reached.
19 I use the Clarida, Gali and Gertler (CGG) calibration for US. Similar results obtain with the Woodford
(W) calibration.24
Tab 1











The fact that the learning speed could be very slow (or very fast) depending on policy
decisions
20, suggests that when they consider the monetary policy design problem under
learning, policy-makers should take into account the transition to the REE. E-stability, once
transition is taken into account, is not itself sufﬁcient to characterize a policy in a context of
bounded rationality, and policy (2.21), which is optimal under rational expectations, may not
be optimal under learning.
In thefollowing sections I showthat, in general, the analysis of thespeed of convergence
is helpful in evaluating policy rules.
3. Speed of convergence and policy design
Let us consider a third and more generic set of expectations-based reaction functions
it = γ + γxE
∗
t xt+1 + γπE
∗
t πt+1 + γggt (3.1)
and show how to discriminate between the elements of this set using a measure of the speed
of convergence.
20 This result could be applied to the problem of “optimal delegation”,j u s t i ﬁng a conservative central bank







and write the ALM of inﬂation and output gap, obtained by substituting (3.1) into (2.1) and
(2.2):
Yt = Q + F × E
∗
t Yt+1 + Sgt, (3.2)
where Q and S are vectors that depend respectively on policy parameters γ and γg and F is a



















(β + αϕ(1 −γπ)) α(1 − ϕγx)














The following lemma provides a characterization of the REE obtained under the generic
expectations-based reaction functions (3.1), showing how the choice of the reaction to the
expected inﬂation and output gap (i.e., the value of γπ and γx) determines the equilibrium
level of inﬂation and output gap under the rational expectations hypothesis.
Lemma 8 In the REE, under expectations-based reaction functions (3.1), for γ ￿= 0,f o r
γπ > 1 the higher the value of γπ the higher inﬂation and output gap (in absolute values), for
γπ < 1 the higher the value of γπ the lower the inﬂation and the output gap level; moreover,
the higher the value of γx the lower the inﬂation and output gap level (in absolute values).26
Proof. See Appendix 2.G.
3.1 The learning mechanism
Under the generic expectations-based reaction functions (3.1), if private agents update
their forecasts through recursive least squares algorithms, expected inﬂation and output gap
evolve in a more complex way then described in section 2.3. As both the IS and the
AS relations also depend on the expected output gap
21, the learning equilibrium cannot be
described only by focusing on beliefs regarding expected inﬂation (see Appendix 2.H for a
complete description of the learning mechanism under the generic reaction function of the
type (3.1)).




tYt+1 = At, (3.7)
where At are statistics inferred from past data according to
At = At−1 + t
−1(Yt−1 − At−1). (3.8)
By substituting (3.7) into (3.2) I obtain the ALM of inﬂation and output gap under
adaptive learning
Yt = T (At)+Sgt,
where T (.) is the mapping from PLM to ALM




= T (A) − A (3.9)
21 In equation (3.2) I do not impose thattheelementsin the second column of the Rmatrixarenotnecessarily
zero.27
is the associated ordinary differential equation. Note that the unique ﬁxed point of the T-map
is the vector A derived in equation (3.6). As in section 2.3, the REE is said to be E-stable if
it is locally asymptotically stable under equation (3.9) and under some regularity conditions.
Underlying the role of policy decisions, the following lemma describes the necessary and
sufﬁcient conditions under which the REE (3.5) is E-stable.
Lemma 9 Under a generic expectations-based reaction function (3.1), the necessary and
sufﬁcient conditions for a rational expectations equilibrium to be E-stable are









γπ > 1 −
(1 − β)
α
γx for γx ≥
−1+β
ϕβ
Proof. See Appendix 2.H.



















Notethat, sincetheRE-optimalexpectations-based policyrule (2.21)isanelement ofthe
set of generic expectations-based policy rules (3.1), points A and B represent the combination
22 A similar ﬁgure was obtained under Woodford (1999) calibration.28
γ￿
π,γ￿
x in the two extreme cases where policy-makers do not care about the output gap, λ = 0
(point A), and where they give equal weight to both inﬂation and the output gap, λ =1(point
B). Figure 5 shows that in both cases the REE is E-Stable
23.H o w e v e r ,f o rλ =1this is very
close to the bounds of the E-stability region; in this case, if the policy-maker chooses the RE-
optimal expectations-based policy rule but improperly calibrates the model it can easily end
up outside the stability region, enforcing a non-stationary policy.
Finally, the fact that the origin is not in the stable region is consistent with the non-
convergence result of Evans and Honkapohja (2002): policies that react only to shocks,
ignoring expectations, are unstable under learning.
3.2 The transition to the REE
In the previous sections, I have shown that policy-makers settle the coefﬁcients of matrix
F, by means of reaction functions. This means that the evolution of estimated coefﬁcients in
private agents’ forecasts (i.e., the speed at which private agents learn) strictly depends on
policy decisions.
Proposition 10 Let us deﬁne
Q1 =
￿
γπ,γx : γx ≤
4β − 1
4ϕβ









γπ,γx : γx ≥
4β − 1
4ϕβ









Under expectations-based reaction functions (3.1), if (γπ,γx) ∈ Q1 or Q2,t h e nt h e
speed of convergence of the learning equilibrium is Root-t, that is
√
t(At − A)
D → N (0,Ω)
23 It is possible, moreover, to show that for any positive and ﬁnite value of λ, i.e., for all ﬂexible inﬂation tar-
geting policies under the optimal expectation-based reaction function (2.21) the rational expectation equilibrium
is E-Stable (Evans and Honkapohja, 2002).29















g = 0 (3.10)
Proof. See Appendix 2.I.
Under the generic expectations-based reaction function (3.1), if the REE is E-stable but
conditions in proposition 10 are not satisﬁed, then not all the eigenvalues of the matrix F
are smaller than one half. In this case, as suggested in section 2.3, the learning equilibrium
converges to the REE at a slower rate than root-t.
Figure 6 shows all combinations of γπ and γx for which there is root-t convergence.
Fig 6














By comparing Figure 5 and Figure 6, it is apparent that the set of combinations (γx,γπ)
resulting in root-t convergence is much smaller than the one under which E-stability holds.
Points A and B inFigure 6 show the combination γ￿
π,γ￿
x, i.e., the reaction to expected inﬂation
and output gap under the RE-optimal expectations-based policy rule, in the two extreme cases
where policy-makers do not care about the output gap, λ =0(point A), and where they give
equal weight to both inﬂation and the output gap, λ =1(point B) .A sd e r i v e di ns e c t i o n2 . 4 ,
Figure 6 shows that when the policy-maker gives weight λ =1there is no root-t convergence.30
In the previous sections, in order to characterize how policies determine the speed of
converge to REE, I focused only on one policy parameter at a time (γπ in section 2.3 and λ in
section 2.4). Here, on the contrary, since the speed of convergence, as suggested by Marcet
and Sargent (1995), is determined by the eigenvalues of F and this matrix depends on both γπ
and γx, I have to focus on two policy parameters at a time. For this reason I deﬁne the speed of
convergence isoquants that map elements of the set of expectations-based reaction functions
into a speed of convergence measure.
Deﬁnition 1 A speed of convergence isoquant is a curve in R2 along which all points (i.e.,
combinations (γπ,γx) of an expectations-based reaction function (3.1)) result in the same real
p a r to ft h el a r g e s te i g e n v a l u ez1of the matrix F
24.
For simplicity I restrict the analysis to the set
Γ={γπ,γx : γπ > 0,γx > 0 and 0 ≤ z1 < 1}.
The following deﬁnition and proposition describe the main properties of the speed of
convergence isoquants:
Deﬁnition 2 The speed of convergence, represented by the speed of convergence isoquants, is
monotonically increasing in the reaction to expected inﬂation (γπ) if, given the reaction to the
expected output gap (γx), the real part of the largest eigenvaluez1of the matrixF is decreasing
in γπ.
A similar deﬁnition for monotonicity with respect to the expected output gap could be
settled.
Proposition 11 The speed of convergence relation, represented by the speed of convergence
isoquants and deﬁned over Γ is: (i) monotonically increasing in γπ, (ii) not monotonic with
respect to γx.
Proof. See Appendix 2.L.
24 In the deﬁnition I relate speed of convergence to the eigenvalues of the matrix F. In general, as shown in
previous sections, the speed of convergence is related to the eigenvalues of the derivatives of the mapping from
PLM to ALM, T(A). In this case, the derivative is equal to F.31
Proposition 13 states that, for a given reaction to output gap expectations, the policy-
maker, by increasing the reaction to expected inﬂation increases monotonically the speed at
which private agents learn. On the contrary, for a given reaction to expected inﬂation, by
increasing the reaction to the expected output gap, private agents could learn both faster or
slower, depending on the value of γπ.
Figure 7 shows the speed of convergence isoquants: the lower the isoquant, the slower
the convergence. In fact, the larger the real part of z1, the lower the isoquant and, from Marcet
and Sargent (1995), the larger the real part of z1, the slower the convergence.
Fig 7
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Figure 7 illustrates a practical way of using the speed of convergence of the learning
equilibrium to characterize monetary policies. For example, a combination of γπ and γx just
above the isoquant z1 = 1 (for example, point B) determines an E-stable REE, but would
imply very slow convergence. The combinations of γπ and γx that stay above the isoquant
z1 =0 .1 imply a very fast learning process. The combinations of γπ and γx that stay above
the isoquant z1 =0 .5 imply a learning process that converges to the REE at a root-t speed.
Let us now see how to make active use of the speed of convergence in the study of
optimal policies under discretion.32
4. Discretionary policy and learning
In section 2.4, it was shown that under rational expectations the optimal monetary policy
under discretion is given by the reaction function (2.21). Now, considering the generic set of
expectations-based reaction functions ( 3 . 1 )w eh a v et h a t
Proposition 12 Under rational expectations, there are inﬁnitely many expectations-based
reaction functions, i.e., combinations of γ,γx,γπ,γg that result inthe optimal REE for {πt,x t}
deﬁned in (2.23) and (2.24).
Proof. See Appendix 2.M.
Evans and Honkapohja (2002) say that the expectations-based reaction function (2.21)
is not only a “good” policy because it determines an E-stable REE, but it also “implements
optimal discretionary policy in every period and for all values of private expectations” in a
context where “private agents behave in aboundedly rational way”. In order to identify (2.21)
as the optimal policy rule under discretion and learning, however, the crucial assumption is
that “the policy-maker does not make active use of learning behaviour on the part of agents”
(Evans and Honkapojha, 2002).
If, under rational expectations, the problem of optimal “discretionarypolicy” implies, by
deﬁnition, that policy-makers cannot affect private agents’ expectations, under the hypothesis
of bounded rational private agents, since policy decisions affect the learning process, a rational
policy-maker with full information should take properties of the learning equilibrium into
account in solving the monetary policy design problem. In fact, if private agents’ expectations
are the result of the estimates of the learning parameters that depend on past values of the
monetary policy instrument, the policy-maker’s decisions, will affect future estimates and,
consequently, the private agents’ learning process
25.T h eexpectations-based reaction function
(2.21) isnotnecessarilyoptimal under learningbutcouldbedeﬁnedasasymptotically-optimal.
However, if private agents’ perceived lawof motion is well speciﬁed, once the learning process
has converged to rational expectations, not only the policy rule (2.21) will be optimal, but
proposition 14 says there is a continuum of expectations-based policy rules that result in
the same REE. Since these policies could determine different learning equilibria along the
25 See Dedola and Ferrero (2003) for a derivation of the truely optimal policy under learning.33
transition to the REE, a device for discriminating between them is required
26 and the speed of
convergence isoquants derived in the previous section could be a useful starting point.
Let us consider a restricted set of asymptotically-optimal expectations-based reaction
functions and describe the speed of convergence that these determine along the transition to
the REE.
Proposition 13 The maximum speed of convergence of the learning process that could




































λ((1 + αϕ)(λ + α2) − λβ)







dependsnegativelyon the weight that thepolicy-maker gives to output gap relativeto inﬂation.
Proof. See Appendix 2.N.
Proposition 15 states that taking the set of reaction functions with coefﬁcients γ￿
and γ￿







x, the economy converges asymptotically to the optimal
REE under discretion, but for a given λ the policy-maker can bring about a different speed
of convergence. Note, instead, that under policy rule (2.21) for each λ there was a given
speed of convergence. In particular, under asymptotically optimal expectations-based reaction
functions (4.1), the larger the relative weight on output gap (λ), the larger will be the real part
of the biggest eigenvalue of the F matrix and the slower the fastest speed of convergence that
a policy-maker could induce.
26 “There is no single policy rule that is uniquely consistent with the optimal equilibrium. Many rules may
be consistent with the same equilibrium, even though they are not equivalent insofar as they imply a commitment
to different sorts of out-of equilibrium behaviour” (Svensson and Woodford, 1999).34
Figure 8 shows, in the same picture, the speed of learning isoquants and, for given λ,
combinations of γx and γx under which the economy will converge asymptotically to the
optimal REE under discretion.
Fig 8
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The line λ = 0 shows that if the policy-maker does not care about the output gap,
by imposing γπ = γ￿
π, he can choose combinations of γπ and γx such that the speed of
convergence ranges from very slow to very fast: the line λ =0 , in fact, intersects isoquants
z1 =0 .1 (very fast speed),z1 =0 .7 (speedofconvergenceslower than root-t)and manyothers.
If, instead, the relative weight to output gap is one half, i.e., the line λ =0 .5, the policy-maker
couldchooseonlycombinations ofγπ and γx such that the speed of convergenceis slower than
root-t: the line λ =0 .5 does not intersect any isoquant with z1 ≤ 0.5; if the policy-maker cares
equally about inﬂation and output gap, i.e., the line λ =1 , he can choose only combinations
of γπ and γx such that the speed of convergence is very slow, slower than root-t, since the line
λ =1does not intersect any isoquant with z1 ≤ 0.7.
Points A and B in Figure 8 also show another important result that will be analyzed
further in the next section: for a given value of λ there are inﬁnitely many expectations-based
policies that determine asymptotically the same REE, but induce a faster (or slower) speed of
convergence than the one determined by policy (2.21).35
4.1 The mapping from PLM to ALM
In order to show how the central bank can make active use of private agents’ learning
behaviour in the monetary policy design problem under discretion, I now consider more in
detail the mapping from perceived to actual variables.



































































In order to study the convergence of the learning equilibrium to the REE, section 2.3





The necessary and sufﬁcient condition for E-stability reduces to Γ∗ < 1.
To give an example, since I consider λ to be an exogenous policy parameter, let us
assume that the policy-maker gives a positive weight λ =0 .5 (note that with this weight I
assume that the policy-maker cares twice as strongly about inﬂation than about output gap). In
this case the mapping T (aπ,t) has a slope equal to 0.84 under CGG parametrization. Figure 9
shows the mapping from PLM to ALM.36
Figure 9 shows that, even if initial perceived inﬂation is not too far from the REE,
since the slope of the T(.) mapping is close to 1, the transition from the learning to the
RE equilibrium is very slow.
Fig 9
The mapping T(aπ,t)from PLM to ALM (λ = 0.5)
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4.2 Adjusting the learning speed
In the previous section, under the RE-optimal expectations-based reaction function
(2.21) suggested by Evans and Honkapohja (2002) (EH policy from now on), if the policy-
maker follows a ﬂexible inﬂation targeting policy rule with λ = 0.5, the private agents’
learning process will converge very slowly to the RE (slower than root-t convergence). The
question now is how a policy-maker who wants in the long run (i.e., once the private agents
have learned the REE) to reach the same REE determined by the reaction function (2.21) can
speed up or slow down the private agents’ learning process. To answer to this question let us
introduce a new expectations-based policy rule
27:
27 At the beginning of this section I showed an asymptotically-optimal policy (4.1) that allowed a choice
to be made among different speeds of convergence. However, under that policy, the analysis of the learning
dynamics involved a mapping from PLM to ALM with both perceived inﬂation and output gap. Here, instead, I
consider a policy that allows a choice between diffent speeds of convergence just by looking at a mapping from
PLM to ALM involving only expected inﬂation, as under the RE-optimal expectations-based reaction function
(2.21).37
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where 1 < Γ￿ < 0 is the slope of the new mapping from perceived inﬂation to actual inﬂation


























that does not depend on the perceived output gap. Therefore, in order to study convergence of
the learning equilibrium to the REE, as under EH policy, the analysis can concentrate on the
mapping from perceived inﬂation to actual inﬂation (4.9).
Figure 10 shows the new mapping T￿ (aπ,t) under the ALS-Γ￿policy. In particular, it can
beobserved that T ￿ (aπ,t) has thesameﬁxed point, aπ, as under the EH policy, but the intercept
and the slope are different. The policy-maker, in order to speed up (slow down) the transition
to the REE should follow an expectations-based reaction function that induces a rotation of
the mapping from PLM to ALM around the ﬁxed-point (i.e., the REE), with a slope Γ￿ lower
(higher) than under the EH policy.38
Fig 10
The mapping T￿
aπ (aπ,t) under the ALS-Γ￿ policy (Γ￿ < Γ∗)
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The following proposition compares the REE and asymptotic properties of the learning
equilibrium under ALS-Γ￿ and EH policies.
Proposition 14 Under rational expectations, the ALS-Γ￿ policy results in the same REE for
{πt,x t} derived under the EH policy. Under least squares learning, the ALS-Γ￿ policy results
asymptotically in the same REE for {πt,x t} derived under the EH policy.
Proof. See Appendix 2.O.
To stress the differences in the role of the policy-maker in determining the properties
of the learning equilibrium along the transition to the REE, under ALS-Γ￿ and under the EH
policies, consider again equations (4.3) and (4.8).
Taking parameters α,ϕ,β as given, under the EH policy, the speed of convergence of
the learning equilibrium to the REE relies entirely on λ. By choosing a λ the policy-maker is
also choosing the slope of the T (.) mapping (in the previous example, with λ =0 .5, the slope
was equal to 0.84) and, as shown in section 2, he determines the speed of convergence.
On the contrary, under ALS-Γ￿ policy, the policy-maker could choose separately the
relative weight on output gap and the speed at which agents learn, i.e., the slope of the T (.)








αϕ + β. (4.11)
Equation (4.11) shows that, given the parameters α,ϕ,β, each value of the policy
reaction parameter γALS
π has a corresponding slope of the T(.) mapping, Γ￿, independently
from λ. In particular,
Lemma 15 The response of interest rate to a rise in expected inﬂation is higher under the
ALS-Γ￿ than under the EH policy if Γ￿ < Γ∗,i sl o w e ri fΓ￿ > Γ∗.
Proof. See Appendix 2.P.
The following proposition formally compares the transition under ALS-Γ￿ and under the
EH policies.
















actual inﬂation under ALS-Γ￿ and EH policies. Finally,
assume that the economy starts from a point where the learning equilibrium and the REE do




























































































Proof. See Appendix 2.Q.
Proposition 19 says that if initial perceived inﬂation is the same under both policies but
different from the REE, under an ALS-Γ￿ policy that induces a ﬂat slope in the T() mapping,
perceived and actual inﬂation will always be closer to the REE than under the EH policy.T h e
opposite is true when the mapping under ALS-Γ￿ policy is steeper than under EH policy.
In general, comparing two ALS-Γ￿ policies gives the following corollary to Proposition
19.
Corollary 17 Consider two ALS policies iALS (Γ￿
1) and iALS (Γ￿
2) with 0 < Γ￿
1 < Γ￿

























































The intuition isthe following: if thepolicy-maker reacts strongly to a changein expected
inﬂation, the difference between private agents’ expectations and actual inﬂation will be
greater; since for 0 <t<∞ if privateagents make larger errors theywill adapt their estimates
faster, the transition to the REE will be shorter. In other words, the stronger the policy-maker’s
response to a change in private agents’ expectations, the faster private agents learn and the
shorter the transition to the REE.
The fact that under the ALS policy for every 0 <t<∞ the distance from the REE
could be smaller (greater) than under the EH policy could be used to address the following
question: how long does it take under the two policies to get ε-close to the REE, i.e., starting41
from the same distance from the REE, |aπ,0 − aπ| >ε , how many periods are needed under
the two policies to have |πt − aπ| <ε ?
Figure 11 compares the results of a simulationunder the EH policy rule (2.21) andunder
anALS policywithΓ￿ =0 .5 (i.e., root-t convergenceis imposed)assuming an initial perceived
inﬂation 15 per cent higher than the REE.
Fig 11






Deviation (%) Deviation (%)
Under the ASL policy, after 1 quarter the distance to the REE is already halved, after
3 quarters the distance is below 5 per cent and after 20 q u a r t e r si ti sb e l o w2 per cent. On
the contrary, under EH policy, more than 100 quarters are necessary to halve the distance and
more than 500 to reduce it to 5 percent.
Table 2compares thetransitionof thelearningequilibrium totheREEfor different ALS-
Γ￿ policies. Let us consider, for example, the ALS-Γ￿ policy with γALS
π =2 .6. Assuming an
initial perceived inﬂation 15 per cent higher than the REE, the distance from the REE can be
reduced to less than 5 per cent, in:
- 1/2 of the time needed under the ALS-Γ￿ with γALS
π =2 .3
- approximately 1/5 of the time needed under the ALS-Γ￿ with γALS
π =2
- approximately 1/40 of the time needed under the ALS-Γ￿ with γALS
π =1 .642
- approximately 1/150 of the time needed under the EH policy!
Tab 2
Transition under the ALS-Γ￿ policy
γALS
π Γ￿ T(<10%) T(<5%) T(<3%) T(<1%)
4.0 0.1 11 1 2
3.6 0.2 11 2 5
3.3 0.3 11 21 0
30 . 4 12 42 4
2.6 0.5 13 87 2
2.3 0.6 1 6 21 322
20 . 7 2 16 90 3489
1.6 0.8 4 114 1461 > 10000
1.51 0.84 64 4 5 > 10000 > 10000
1.3 0.9 30 > 10000 > 10000 > 10000
1For γALS
π =1 .5, the ALS and EH policies coincide.
This section looked at the role of policy decisions in determining the speed of
convergence under learning, focusing on the mapping from perceived inﬂa t i o nt oa c t u a l
inﬂation. Now, before asking how the policy-maker can make use of this role to increase
social welfare, a brief analysis is made of the behaviour of the output gap along the transition.
Fig. 12
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Mappings (4.5) and (4.10) show that the actual output gap, under both EH and ALS
policies, depends only on perceived inﬂation (Figure 12). In particular,
Lemma 18 Under EH and ALS policies, when initial perceived inﬂation is higher (lower)
than the REE, the output gap converges to the REE from below (above).
Proof. See Appendix 2.R.
Now it is possible to return to the question addressed at the beginning of the paper: is
the RE-optimal expectations-based reaction function still optimal under learning? Are policies
that speed up the learning process always better than policies that involve a slow transition to
the REE?
5. Welfare analysis
In January 1999, with the start of stage 3 of the Economic and Monetary Union,
monetary competencies were transferred from each country of the European Union to the
European Central Bank. Before that date people were accustomed to take into account the
monetary policy of their own country when making economic decisions. After the start of
stage 3, they faced a new policy-maker (and a new monetary policy) and inﬂation and output
gap equilibria determined under the new policy regime were, in some cases, different from
the ones implied by the previous policies. Let us consider, for example, countries like Italy or
Spain, whose rates of inﬂation are historically higher than in other member states, and assume
that in those two countries expected inﬂation at the start of the EMU was higher than the REE
determined by the new monetary regime. Under the assumption that private agents need time
to learn the new equilibrium, it is clear that the dynamics of the learning equilibrium along the
transition to the REE play an important role in the analysis of monetary policy decisions based
on welfare measures. Questions like the ones raised at the end of the previous section show up
spontaneously.
To answer to those questions I consider separately the two cases where initial expected
inﬂation is higher than the REE and where it is lower. The reason why I proceed in this way is
that in the literature it is well known that under the loss function (2.18) the ﬁrst best plan would
be, for all t,t oh a v ei n ﬂation and output gap at their target levels, i.e., πFB
t =0and xFB
t = x.44
As many works have shown, under no commitment, the ﬁrst best solution is not feasible if
x ￿=0 . The optimal (time-consistent) policy in this case leads to a REE with inﬂation higher
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Under learning, however, monetary policies could result in a learning equilibrium that
remains far from the REE for a long (or short) time. Therefore, if initial perceived inﬂation is
higher than the REE,as in previoussection, actual inﬂation will behigherand output gap lower
than the REE along the transition. In this case, a policy-maker who bases decisions on the loss
function (2.18) would prefer policies that make inﬂation fall and output gap rise quickly to the
REE. On the contrary, if initial perceived inﬂation is lower than the REE, the policy-maker
would prefer policies that make inﬂation climbing and output gap landing slowly to the REE.
Since EH policy is not taking into account the transition, I claim that there are ALS-Γ￿ policies
that will make our economy better off.
In order toverifythis claim, let us start byassumingthat the EH policy (whichis optimal
under RE) is also optimal when private agents form expectations through adaptive learning.
The aim is to compute the welfare cost of alternative monetary policies, i.e., ALS-Γ￿, that
asymptoticallyresult inthesameREEas theRE-optimal expectations-based reaction function,
but along the transition result in different learning equilibria.


















28 Under CGG parametrization, assuming λ =0 .5, the REE would be
















denote the contingent plans for inﬂation and output gap under EH policy.























Three measures of the welfare cost (or gain) of adopting policy ALS-Γ￿ instead of the
reference EH policy are considered.
5.1 Percentage loss in total welfare
This measure of the welfare loss (gain) is merely the percentage increase (decrease) in






















< 0 there is a welfare gain in adopting ALS-Γ￿





> 0, there is a welfare loss.
I run simulationsof themodel for 10000 periods, assumingthat thepolicy-maker follows
a ﬂexible inﬂation targeting policy rule with λ = 0.5, the output gap target is x =0 .02 and
using CGG calibration. I start with the assumption of an initial expected inﬂation 15 per
cent higher than the REE and I compute social losses under the EH and ALS-Γ￿ policies for
different values of γALS
π (i.e., different Γ￿).
Figure 13 shows that ALS-Γ￿ policies with Γ￿ < Γ∗, by inducing a fast convergence,
reduce the social loss up to 11 per cent relative to EH policy. Policies with Γ￿ > Γ∗,o nt h e
contrary, increase the social loss by up to 10 per cent. In particular, a central bank that follows
an ALS-Γ￿ policywithγALS
π =2 .6 can, by increasing thespeed of convergenceto root-t,l o w e r
the value of the loss function by 8.6 per cent relative to the EH policy. In order to analyze how
the percentage increase (decrease) in the social loss evolves along the transition simulations
are also run for T<10000 periods.46
Fig 13
Percentage loss in total welfare (π0 >π RE)
Loss (%)
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Table 3 shows the results for different T, pointing out that most of the gain from using
an ALS-Γ￿ policy with fast transition is concentrated in the ﬁrst 20 periods.
Tab 3
Percentage loss in total welfare after T periods (π0 >π RE)
γALS
π Γ￿ T=10 T=20 T=50 T=100 T=10000
4.0 0.1 −9.7 −11.3 −12.0 −11.9 −11.3
3.6 0.2 −8.9 −10.6 −11.4 −11.4 −10.9
3.3 0.3 −8.0 −9.6 −10.6 −10.7 −10.5
30 . 4 −7.0 −8.5 −9.6 −9.8 −9.7
2.6 0.5 −5.8 −7.2 −8.3 −8.6 −8.6
2.3 0.6 −4.4 −5.6 −6.6 −7.0 −7.1
20 . 7 −2.8 −3.6 −4.3 −4.7 −4.9
1.6 0.8 −0.9 −1.1 −1.4 −1.5 −1.6
1.51 0.84 00 0 0 0
1.3 0.9 1.52 .02 .52 .93 .2
1.1 0.95 2.83 .85 .05 .86 .647
Figure 14 and Table 4 show that under the assumption of an initial expected inﬂation
15 per cent lower than the REE, by inducing a slower convergence, the policy-maker could
greatly reduce the welfare loss.
Fig 14
Percentage loss in total welfare (π0 <π RE)
Loss (%)
Policy ) 95 , 0 ( ' Γ − ALS
Policy ) 5 , 0 ( ' Γ − ALS
Policy EH
Γ′
A central bank that follows an ALS-Γ￿ policy with γALS
π =1 .1 can, by increasing the
slope of the mapping from perceived inﬂation to actual inﬂation to Γ￿ =0 .95,s l o wd o w nt h e
transition and lower the value of the loss function by approximately 7 per cent relative to the
EH policy. On the contrary, apolicy-maker whospeeds up the transitionto root-t convergence,
following an ALS-Γ￿ policy with γALS
π =2 .6, would increase the value of the loss function by
approximately 11 per cent relative to the EH policy (Figure 14).48
Tab 4
Percentage loss in total welfare after T periods (π0 <π RE)
γALS
π Γ￿ T=10 T=20 T=50 T=100 T=10000
4.0 0.1 15.71 6 .31 6 .01 5 .31 4 .2
3.6 0.2 14.21 5 .11 5 .11 4 .61 3 .7
3.3 0.3 12.61 3 .71 4 .01 3 .71 3 .0
30 . 4 10.71 2 .01 2 .61 2 .51 2 .0
2.6 0.5 8.69 .91 0 .71 0 .91 0 .7
2.3 0.6 6.37 .58 .48 .78 .7
20 . 7 3.84 .75 .45 .75 .9
1.6 0.8 1.11 .41 .71 .81 .9
1.5 0.84 0000 0
1.3 0.9 −1.7 −2.3 −2.9 −3.3 −3.6
1.1 0.95 −3.1 −4.3 −5.6 −6.3 −7.1
Table 4 shows that most of the loss from using an ALS-Γ￿ policy with fast transition is
concentrated in the ﬁrst 20 periods.
While the percentage loss (gain) in total welfare from using alternative ALS policies
shows the importance of the speed of convergence when private agents form expectations
through recursive leats squares estimate, this measure of the welfare loss has no simple
economic interpretation. As an alternative measure, the “inﬂation equivalent” can be
calculated.
5.2 The inﬂation equivalent
This measure of the welfare loss, denoted by ωALS
π (Γ￿), is computed as the fraction of
inﬂation under EH policy that a central bank is willing to accept above πt
￿
iEH￿
to be as well

























Note that for values of ωALS
π (Γ￿) > 0 there is a welfare gain in adopting ALS-Γ￿ policy
instead of EH, while for ωALS
π (Γ￿) < 0 there is a welfare loss.
Solving for ωALS
π (Γ￿), for different values of γALS
π , I obtain similar qualitative results
as before (Table 5). However, by computing the “inﬂation equivalent” I can say, for example,
that when initial expected inﬂation is 15 per cent higher than the REE, the inefﬁciency of EH
policy is equivalent to an inﬂation up to 7 per cent higher than πt
￿
iEH￿
.I n o t h e r w o r d s ,
under an ALS-Γ￿ policy with γALS
π =3 .6, welfare can be increased by an amount equivalent
to a reduction of inﬂation of 7 per cent below the πt
￿
iEH￿
level. Again, most of the welfare
differences under ALS and EH policies are concentrated in the ﬁrst 20 periods.
Tab 5
Inﬂation equivalent after T periods
(π0 >π RE)
γALS
π Γ￿ T=10 T=20 T=50 T=100 T=10000
3.6 0.2 5.46 .47 .06 .96 .7
2.6 0.5 3.54 .35 .05 .25 .2
20 . 7 1.62 .12 .62 .82 .9
1.5 0.84 0000 0
1.1 0.95 −1.9 −2.2 −2.9 −3.4 −3.8
(π0 <π RE)
γALS
π Γ￿ T=10 T=20 T=50 T=100 T=10000
3.6 0.2 −8.1 −8.5 −8.6 −8.3 −7.8
2.6 0.5 −5.0 −5.7 −6.1 −6.2 −6.1
20 . 7 −2.2 −2.7 −3.2 −3.3 −3.4
1.5 0.84 0000 0
1.1 0.95 1.82 .53 .33 .84 .3
Before concluding I wish to emphasize two aspects concerning the robustness of welfare
results.
5.3 Robustness
In the previous section the speed of convergence and welfare were studied by running
simulations with λ = 0.5 and x =0 .02. Changing these parameters would not change the
ﬁnding that EHpolicy, thatisoptimal underrationalexpectations, isnotoptimalunder learning
andthat, wheninitial perceivedinﬂation ishigherthan theREE,thecentralbankcould increase50
welfare by inducing a faster transition. However, in the extreme case where x =0 , if initial
inﬂation is lower than the REE, the ﬁnding that a slower convergence to the REE increases
welfare does not hold anymore. In fact, when x =0 , in our model, the optimal policy under
discretion results in a REE with inﬂation and output gap equal to the ﬁrst best, and the faster
the transition the higher will be welfare under learning.
The new-Keynesian model analyzed in this paper is derived assuming that only one
shock affects the economy. Under this assumption the policy-maker neutralizes the real effects





However, when an additional shock hits the economy (for example, a “cost-push shock”, ut)
the policy-maker cannot, in general, neutralize both shocks at the same time. In this case,
since the two policies along the transition to the REE would react differently to ut, welfare
analysis could be affected. Simulations show that the introduction of a cost-push shock affects
the results only in the amount of the welfare gain (or loss).
Tab 6
Percentage loss in total welfare with cost-push shocks (T = 10000)
(π0 >π RE)
γALS






4.0 0.1 5.6 −11.1
3.6 0.2 5.4 −10.8
2.6 0.5 4.5 −8.9
1.6 0.7 2.9 −5.2
1.5 0.84 00
1.1 0.95 −2.37 .3
(π0 <π RE)
γALS






4.0 0.1 −15.02 4 .2
3.6 0.2 −14.52 3 .3
2.6 0.5 −11.11 7 .7
1.6 0.7 −5.99 .8
1.5 0.84 00
1.1 0.95 9.0 −11.251
Table 6 shows that adding an AR(1) shock ut in the aggregate supply expression
29, when
initial private agents’ perceived inﬂation is higher than the REE, a central bank that follows an
ALS-Γ￿ policy with γALS
π =2 .6 can lower the value of the loss function by approximately 9
per cent relative to the EH policy (8.6 per cent without cost-push shocks); when initial private
agents’ perceived inﬂation is lower than the REE, an ALS-Γ￿ policy with γALS
π =1 .1 can
lower the value of the loss function by approximately 11.2 per cent (7.1 per cent without cost-
push shocks). In terms of inﬂation equivalent, in the ﬁrst case, under an ALS-Γ￿ policy with
γALS
π =2 .6, welfare could be increased by an amount equivalent to a reduction of inﬂation of
4.5 per cent below the πt
￿
iEH￿
level (5.2 per cent without cost-push shocks); in the second
case, an ALS-Γ￿ policy with γALS




level (4.3 per cent without cost-push shocks).
The results obtained in this section show that optimal policies derived under RE are not
optimal under learning. Usingresultsfor thespeedofconvergencecouldhelp to increasesocial
welfare by taking intoaccount thetransitionfrom learning equilibrium tothe REE. Solving for
the true optimal policy under discretion and learning would envolve taking into account that
the policy-maker could make active use of private agents’ learning behaviour. However, since
the optimal monetary policy has to be derived by substituting the private agents’ PLM into the
objective function, it would be time-dependent. Further analysis in this direction is required
and will be left for future research.
6. Conclusions
In this paper I have shown that considering learning in a model of monetary policy
design is particularly important in order to describe not only the asymptotic properties of
rational expectations equilibrium to which the economy could converge, but even to describe
the dynamics that characterize the transition to this equilibrium.
The central message of the paper is that policy-makers should not only look at monetary
policies that determine a stable equilibrium under learning, but also take into account how
policy decisions affect the speed at which learning converges to rational expectations. In
particular, under certain policies, the REE is E-stable, but the period needed to converge to
29 I assume λ =0 .5, x =0 .02, ut = ρuut−1 +εu,t with ρu =0 .5 and εu,t ∼ N (0,0.05)52
this equilibrium could be incredibly long. Reacting strongly to expected inﬂation, a central
bank would shorten the transition and increase the speed of convergence from the learning
equilibrium to the REE.
Apolicy-makerwho considershisroleindetermining thedynamicsoftheprivateagents’
learning process could choose a policy rule that induces agents to learn at a given speed,
affecting the welfare of society. In particular, if the policy-maker knows that after a regime
change private agents’ perceived inﬂation would be higher than the REE, by choosing a policy
that reacts strongly to expected inﬂation he would determine a fast convergence and could
increase social welfare. If, instead, perceived inﬂation is initially lower than the REE, a slow
transition is preferred when the output gap target is greater than zero, a fast transition when
the target is equal to zero.Appendix 1
To derive the REE, consider the mapping from the PLM to the ALM
T (aπ,a x)=( αϕγ +( β + αϕ(1 − γπ))aπ,ϕγ+ ϕ(1 −γπ)aπ)
and analyze the ordinary differential equation (ODE):
d
dτ
(aπ,a x)=T (aπ,a x) − (aπ,a x)
where τ denotes notional time. The REE can be derived by looking at the ﬁxed point of the
differential equation, by imposing d
dτ (aπ,a x)=0 :
aπ = αϕγ (1 − β − αϕ(1 − γπ))
−1



















A. PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The necessary and sufﬁcient condition for determinancy of the REE is given by all the
eigenvalues of the matrix
￿
β + αϕ(1 − γπ)0
ϕ(1 −γπ)0
￿
being inside the unit circle; since the eigenvalues are equal to 0 and β +αϕ(1 − γπ) it is only
necessary to check for −1 <β+ αϕ(1 − γπ) < 1.
B. PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Consider (2.6) and take derivatives




α2ϕ2γ (1 − γπ)
[1 − β − αϕ(1 − γπ)]
2
and




αϕ2γ (1 − β)(1− γπ)





> 0 iff γπ > 1
∂ax
∂γπ
> 0 iff γπ > 1
C. PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Consider the ordinary differential equation (ODE)
daπ
dτ
= T (aπ) − aπ
= αϕγ +[ β + αϕ(1 − γπ)]aπ −aπ55
The solution of daπ
dτ = 0 is
aπ = αϕγ [1 − β − αϕ(1 − γπ)]
−1
is E-stable under the dynamics of the ODE (Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Evans and
Honkapohja, 2001) if and only if
[β + αϕ(1 − γπ)] < 1
that is
γπ > 1 −
1 −β
αϕ
D. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Given the recursive stochastic algorithm
aπ,t = aπ,t−1 + t
−1(αϕγ +[ β + αϕ(1 − γπ)]aπ,t−1 + αgt−1 − aπ,t−1)
let
h(aπ)=[ αϕγ +[ β + αϕ(1 − γπ)]aπ −aπ]
and let aπ be such that h(aπ)=0 . By the theorem of Benveniste et. al.(Theorem 3, page 110),














a + E [αϕγ +[ β + αϕ(1 − γπ)]aπ − aπ + αgt]
2 =056
Note that the derivative of E [αϕγ +[ β + αϕ(1 − γπ)]aπ − aπ] being smaller than




E. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5














αϕ(1 − β − αϕ(1 − γπ))





F. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7
The argument is similar to the one used in the proof of Propositions 4 and 5.








For values of λ>
α2
2β−1 there is no root-t convergence and, as in lemma 3, convergence will be
slower.
G. PROOF OF LEMMA 8
Consider (3.5) and (3.6) and take derivatives




α2γ (1 − γπ)
[(1 − β)γx − (1 − γπ)α]
2
and




αγ (1 − β)(1− γπ)





> 0 iff γπ > 1
∂ax
∂γπ
> 0 iff γπ > 1




αγ (1 − β)
[(1 − β)γx − (1 − γπ)α]
2 < 0
and




γ (1 − β)
2
[(1 − β)γx − (1 −γπ)α]
2 < 0







the (3.2) can be rewritten as
Yt = g (EtYt+1,ε πt,ε xt,η)
where η is a vector of parameters in the economy that includes parameters of monetary policy.
Underleast squareslearning hypothesis, it isassumedthat theprivateagentsdo notknow
the effective value of the aπ,a x coefﬁcients, but estimate them through recursive least square
regressions. In this case, agents’ expectations are given by:
EtYt+1 = h(ut,a π,t(µ),a x,t (µ))
where aπ,t(µ) and ax,t (µ) are certain statistics inferred from past data and h is the forecast
function that depends on today’s state and the statistics. These statistics are generated by58
learning mechanisms fx and fπ
aπ,t(µ)=fπ (aπ,t−1(µ),ε πt,µ)
ax,t (µ)=fx(ax,t−1(µ),ε xt,µ)
where µ are certain learning parameters that govern how past data are used to form the
statistics.






I assume learning mechanisms fx and fπ
aπ,t = aπ,t−1 + t
−1 (πt−1 − aπ,t−1)
ax,t = ax,t−1 + t
−1(xt−1 − ax,t−1)
The PLM of the boundedly rational agents is assumed to be well speciﬁed
30. Under least
square learning, agents at time t estimate the model
πt = aπ + κπt
xt = ax + κxt
by running a least squares regression of πt and xt on an intercept using available data. Let
(aπ,t, ax,t) denote the least squares estimate using data on πi, xi , i =1 ,...,t−1. Expectations
30 Aw e l l - s p e c i ﬁed PLM is one that considers all the state variables that we have unde RE:
πt = aπ
xt = ax59

















= Q+ FA t
Thus the mapping from PLM to ALM takes the form
T (A
￿
t) = Q + FA t
Consider the stability under learning (E-stability) of the rational expectation solution A
as the situation where the estimated parameters At converge to A over time.








For this framework E-stability conditions are readily obtained by computing the derivative of
T (A￿)−A￿ andimposing that the determinant of thematrixwiththederivatives ofthe previous
differential equation with respect to A is greater than zero and the trace of the matrix with the
derivative is greater than zero. In particular, the eigenvalues of F, z1 and z2, must have real
parts less than one (let us deﬁne the biggest eigenvalue of the F matrix as z1).
Then, let us distinguish between the two cases:
A. The “real” case.
In this case two conditions must be satisﬁed in order to have convergence to the REE:
I. For reality
(αϕ(1 −γπ)+β +( 1− ϕγx))
2 − 4β (1 − ϕγx) > 060












Since by hypothesis z1 ≥ z2,i fz1 < 1 then also z2 < 1.
Assuming the Clarida, Gali and Gertler calibration, the relation
1.24 − 1.32γπ +0 .09γ
2
π − 0.8γx + γ
2
x +0 .6γπγx > 0
shows the combinations of γπ,γx for which the eigenvalues z1 and z2 are real.
In order to have z1 < 1




Graphically, it is necessary to be inside the shadowed area.










B. The “complex” case.
In this case two conditions must be satisﬁed in order to have convergence to the REE:
I. For the solution to be imaginary,
(αϕ(1 − γπ)+β +( 1− ϕγx))
2 − 4β (1 − ϕγx) < 061
II. Real part of z1 < 1










Since by hypothesis z1 ≥ z2,i fz1 < 1 then also z2 < 1.
Assuming the Clarida, Galí and Gertler’s calibration, the relation
(0.3(1− γπ)+0 .9+( 1−γx))
2 − 4 ∗ 0.9(1− γx) < 0
shows the combinations of γπ,γx for which the eigenvalues z1 and z2 are complex.








Graphically, it is necessary to be inside the shadowed area.










In the following pictures, the shadowed areas represent the combinations of γπ and γx
for which least squares learning converges to rational expectations, under the alternative
values of the parameters given by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999).62














Note that the “optimal” combinations of γπ,γx with the CGG (2000) parameters are:














I. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 10




t) = Q+ FA t63
From Marcet and Sargent (1992) it follows that in order to have root-t convergence the
eigenvalues of F must have the real part smaller than 1
2.
Then, let us distinguish between the two cases:
A. The “real” case.
In this case two conditions must be satisﬁed in order to have convergence to the REE:
I. For reality
(αϕ(1 −γπ)+β +( 1− ϕγx))
2 − 4β (1 − ϕγx) > 0
















Note that if z1is smaller than
1
2 then even z2 is smaller than
1
2.
Assuming the values of the parameters of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), the relation
1.24 − 1.32γπ +0 .09γ
2
π − 0.8γx + γ
2
x +0 .6γπγx > 0
shows the combinations of γπ,γx for which the eigenvalues z1 and z2 are real.
In order to have z1 < 1
2 ,
γπ > −0.33 + 2.67γx
B. The “complex” case.
In this case two conditions to be satisﬁed in order to have root-t convergence:
I. For the solution to be imaginary,
(αϕ(1 −γπ)+β +( 1− ϕγx))
2 − 4β (1 − ϕγx) < 064
II. Real part of z1 <
1
2












Note that if z1is smaller than 1
2 then even z2 is smaller than 1
2.
Assuming the values of the parameters of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), the relation
1.24 − 1.32γπ +0 .09γ
2
π − 0.8γx + γ
2
x +0 .6γπγx < 0
shows the combinations of γπ,γx for which the eigenvalues z1 and z2 have an imaginary
part.
In order to have the real part of z1 <
1
2,
γπ > 4.0 − 3.33γx
L. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 13
Consider the set Γ={γπ,γx : γπ > 0,γx > 0 and 0 ≤ z1 < 1}.
Monotonically increasing with respect to γπ: for every h =( γ1
π,γ1
x) ∈ Γ and
w =( γ2
π,γ1
x) ∈ Γ,w i t hγ2
π ≥ γ1
π, w implies a value for the real part of z1 smaller or equal to
the one with h.
Proof. z1 is the biggest eigenvalue of F:
z1 =





(αϕ(1 − γπ)+β +( 1− ϕγx))
2 − 4β(1 −ϕγx)
2
Consider a h =( γ1
π,γ1
x) ∈ Γ such that z1 = z1
1 is real. In this case
(αϕ(1 − γπ)+β +( 1− ϕγx))
2 − 4β (1 − ϕγx) > 065




x) ∈ Γ with γ2
π ≥ γ1
π.
For the combination (γπ,γx)=w, the biggest eigenvalue of F, z2












π + ε)) + β +( 1− ϕ(γ1
x)))
2 − 4β (γ1
x)
2
There could be two cases:
A. w is such that z2


















Now, it is obvious that z2
1 −z1
1 < 0 and monotonicity with respect to γπ is satisﬁed.
B. w is such that z2
1 is complex. In this case z1












(αϕ(1 −γπ)+β +( 1− ϕγx))
2
< 0
monotonicity with respect to γπ is satisﬁed.
Consider an h =( γ1
π,γ1
x) such that z1
1 is complex. In this case only the real part of z1
1:
(αϕ(1−γπ)+β+(1−ϕγx))
2 is of interest.
Take a w = (γ1
π + ε,γ1
x), in this case ￿w − h￿ =
￿
(γ1




= ε. In the point
(γπ,γx)=w, the biggest eigenvalue of F, z2

















Note now, that if z1
1 is complex, z2
1 cannot be real: if z1
1 is complex 4βγ1
x >
(αϕ(1 − γ1


































x > (αϕ(1 −(γ1
π + ε)) + β +( 1−ϕγ1
x))
2 , i.e., z2
1 is complex. In this case it is
obvious that monotonicity with respect to γπ is satisﬁed.
No Monotonicity with respect to γx: Consider an h = (γ1
π,γ1





x + ε) ∈ Γ such that z1
1 and z2
1 are complex. In this case it is easy to see
(using a similar argument to the previous proof) that z1
1 ≤ z2
1; take now h = (γ1
π,γ1
x) ∈ Γ




x + ε) ∈ Γ such that z1
1 and z2




M. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 14
Substituting the value of the conditional expectations into (2.21), the optimal policy rule















Thisexpressionsaysthat thepolicy-maker should offset demandshocks(gt)byadjusting
the nominal interest rate in order to neutralize any shock to the IS curve. Since this
optimal policy rule involves only the fundamentals of the economy (demand and supply
shocks), it could bedeﬁned astheoptimal fundamentals-basedreactionfunctionunderrational
expectations (Evans and Honkapohja (2002))
31.
Now, consider a generic expectations-based policy rule of the form:
it = γ + γxEtxt+1 + γπEtπt+1 + γggt
31 Many autors (see for example Woodford (1999)) have shown that this interest rate rule leads to indetermi-
nacy, i.e., a multiplicity of rational expectations equilibria.67
Assuming rational expectations, expected values could be substituted in the previous
expression to obtain the following policy rule:
it =( γ + γxax + γπaπ)+γggt
By comparing this equation with the optimal fundamentals-based policy rule, a system
of two equations on four unknowns (γ,γx,γπ,γg) is obtained:
γ




Obviously, this system has multiple solutions.
N. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 15
By considering the values of the coefﬁcients of the reaction function γ∗
g, γ∗,γR and the
rational expectations values ax, aπ given, the combinations of γx and γπ are obtained that
determine asymptotically the same equilibrium derived under the optimal expectations-based
reaction function (2.21):
γπ =






Consider the isoquants of Figure 8:
γπ =1−












γx for γx ≥ ￿ γx











Restricting the analysis to the set Γβ = {γπ,γx :0<z 1 <β ,γ π > 0,γx > 0},n o wt h e











has a solution (use proposition 3.D.1 in Mas-Colell et al., 1995), and there is also an indirect
speed of convergence function v(λ) that is strictly decreasing on λ (use proposition 3.D.3 in
Mas-Colell et al., 1995). The maximum speed of convergence that could be induced by a










−2( β − z1)
αϕβ
< 0 for z1 <β
Now, since the higher the level curve, the faster the convergence, it must be shown that
as λ increases, the line
γπ =






moves downward and the fastest speed of convergence that is feasible is lower, or in other
words the smallest z1 that can be reached is larger.
O. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 17



















































It is evident that the REE under ALS-Γ￿ policy is the same as under the EH policy.
Under learning, when both Γ￿ and Γ∗ are smaller than one the REE is E-stable.
















































































































= aπ,0 ￿= aπ
I will proove the proposition for γALS
π >γ ∗
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